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I. Introduction
One of the most commonly litigated issues in federal diversityjurisdiction
cases is liability arising from car accidents. If the injured party and the
negligent party are from different states and the amount-in-controversy
requirement is met, diversity jurisdiction exists. On the other hand, if the two
parties are from the same state, the matter must be heard in state court. What if
the parties are from the same state, but the injured party's insurance company-
which is from another state-sues the negligent driver to recover the proceeds it
paid to the injured driver? What if the injured driver is a nondiverse minor, but
the suit is brought by a diverse guardian? How does the diversity analysis
change if the guardian was selected solely to create diversity? Does it matter
whether the diverse party is a real party in interest, such as the driver, or
whether he merely has the legal capacity to bring the suit, such as the insurer?
Should it matter? Two scholars, surveying the courts' handling of such
disputes, noted:
The ultimate determination would in most cases be the same, whether one
adopts a capacity or real party in interest criteria. Therefore, there seems to
be little reason to delve Pandora-like into new juristic linguistic variations
on an old theme. It suffices to say that the various text commentaries, law
review excursions, and the case precedents predominantly speak in terms of
real party in interest with emphasis on capacity as an important element in
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determining who is the real party in interest; there seems little reason to stir
otherwise calm waters.'
Over fifty years ago, when this observation was written, its premise was
probably true. The quoted passage concerns the issue of whether, in deciding
whose citizenship controls for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the court
should merely require that a party have the capacity to sue or should require the
party be a real party in interest. Fifty years ago, most courts would look to
whether a party was the real party in interest in determining whether to use that
party's citizenship . More recently though, federal courts have divided over
whether to use the real party in interest criteria. Opponents argue that the less
demanding capacity to sue rule is sufficient to protect against fraud, while at the
same time furthering the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.4 Different circuits
have varied.5
Diversity jurisdiction turns on the citizenship of the parties. While a
determination of whether two parties are sufficiently diverse seems easy, a great
deal of litigation surrounds the issue. Much of the litigation arises in cases
where one party has a subrogated or assigned claim from another party. If the
citizenship of the assignee and assignor is the same, the question is simple.7 If,
however, the assignor and the defendant have the same citizenship, but the
assignee has a different citizenship, the defendant may dispute the right of the
assignee to sue him in federal court on diversity grounds.
The inquiry of whose citizenship controls in a lawsuit raises many
questions. For instance: Under what circumstances did the claim get assigned
or subrogated? Does the assignee have the legal capacity to bring the lawsuit?
Who is the real party in interest? Have the parties colluded to create or defeat
diversity? Are the parties properly aligned? Would the exercise ofjurisdiction
1. Donald S. Cohan & Mercer D. Tate, Manufacturing Federal Diversity Jurisdiction by
the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety, 1 VILL. L. REv. 201, 225-26
(1956).
2. See id. (noting that the predominant rule used by the courts at the time the article was
written was the real party in interest rule).
3. See infra Part VII (discussing the current circuit split).
4. See Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 248 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the
citizenship of a party with the capacity to sue controls for purposes of deciding whether
diversity exists); Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 326-27 (3d Cir. 1955) (same).
5. See infra Part VII.B (noting that the Fifth and Third Circuits have advocated using the
agent's citizenship if he has the capacity to sue, while the Eighth and Second Circuits have
advanced the real party in interest rule).
6. See infra Part VI (describing the different circumstances when this dispute may arise).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (noting that diversity jurisdiction is created only if the
citizens on opposing sides of the suit are from different states).
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by the district court uphold or defeat the original reasons behind the
congressional creation of diversity jurisdiction? Taking into consideration all
these issues, the federal courts of appeals have split on whether the agent's
citizenship controls if he merely has the capacity to sue, or whether he actually
must be the real party in interest. To date, the Fifth8 and the Third9 Circuits
advocate using the agent's citizenship if he has the capacity to sue, while the
Eighth l and the Second" Circuits rely on the real party in interest rule. The
Supreme Court has faced these situations several times, but its decisions have
been anything but enlightening on which rule should prevail. 12
Diversity jurisdiction intends to prevent bias by state court judges against
out-of-state parties.' 3 For this reason, regardless of who is the real party of
interest in the lawsuit, the citizenship of the party who appears before the judge
should decide whether diversity exists-provided that party has the legal
capacity to sue. The one exception to this rule would occur when parties
collude to manufacture or defeat diversity jurisdiction. The attempt to
artificially manufacture jurisdiction violates the command of 28 U.S.C.
8. See Hart, 199 F.3d at 247 (deciding the citizenship of an agent controls in deciding
whether diversity jurisdiction exists as long as he has the capacity to sue).
9. See Fallat, 220 F.2d at 326-27 (noting that courts should consider the citizenship of
the agent for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, presuming he has the capacity to sue).
10. See Associated Ins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ark. Gen. Agency, Inc., 149 F.3d 794, 796 (8th
Cir. 1998) (commenting that the citizenship of the underlying party controls in deciding whether
diversity exists because the underlying party is the real party to the dispute).
11. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1995)
(noting that when an agent is merely representing the interests of another party, his citizenship
should not factor into diversity decisions).
12. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 51 (1954) (noting that the
citizenship of the real party in interest controls in deciding whether diversity jurisdiction exists);
Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 187 (1931) (finding that a suit by an
administrator on behalf of the state should have been dismissed from federal court because the
citizenship of the administrator, not that of the decedent, governs decisions of diversity
jurisdiction); Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1903) (ruling that a
guardian has a legal right to bring an action in his own name, and his citizenship controls in
deciding whether diversity jurisdiction exists); New Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595,
606 (1891) (noting that the subrogee's citizenship, rather than the subrogor's, should dictate
whether diversity exists).
13. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (noting
that Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to create a "neutral forum" for civil actions between
citizens of different states).
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§ 135914 and contradicts Congress's original intent when it passed 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332."
In this Note, Part II examines the background of diversity jurisdiction and
the reasons for its initial adoption by Congress. Part III discusses the recent
developments of diversity jurisdiction as well as the arguments in favor of its
abolishment. Part IV explores the different rules courts have employed to
resolve the diversity dispute. Part V takes a brief look at 28 U.S.C. § 1359,
Congress's attempt to prevent collusion to create or defeat diversity
jurisdiction. Part VI provides examples of how this diversity dispute arises and
what criteria courts have considered in deciding whether diversity exists. Part
VII looks more closely at the circuit split and the reasoning behind each court's
determination of the relevant factors. Finally, Part VIII argues that courts
should use the assignee's citizenship in the diversity decision if the assignee
has the legal capacity to bring the lawsuit. This may not be the most popular
position, but it is the most consistent with the original intent of diversity
jurisdiction. Although this rule threatens that parties will collude to
intentionally create or destroy diversity, United States District Court judges are
capable of recognizing instances of collusion and dismissing those cases.16
II. Brief History of Diversity Jurisdiction
Article III of the Constitution gives Congress the power to create lower
federal courts1 7 and grants those courts jurisdiction in certain categories of
cases, including those "between Citizens of different States... and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."' 8 The
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) (providing that "[a] district court shall not have
jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court").
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (providing for jurisdiction in federal district courts when there
is complete diversity between the parties and where the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2007) (David D. Siegel, cmt. on 1996 amend.)
(noting that the original purpose behind diversity jurisdiction was to prevent bias against out-of-
state litigants).
16. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (describing the means available to
district court judges to prevent collusive joinders designed to manufacture or defeat diversity
jurisdiction).
17. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.").
18. Id. § 2.
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Supreme Court has interpreted Article III itself to require only "minimal" 19
diversity, so that some or all of the claimants could be from the same state as
long as at least one was diverse from the others.20 Congress later implemented
the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.21
In interpreting the statutory definition of diversity, the Court ruled that this new
statute created a "complete diversity" requirement, meaning that no party on
one side can have the same citizenship as a party on the opposing side of the
litigation.2 2  Under this reading of the constitutional grant-a heightened
diversity requirement-the citizenship of claimants on the same side of the
litigation is disregarded, and the focus is on whether anyone on opposing sides
of the litigation shares the same citizenship.2 3
The modem diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, gives federal courts
jurisdiction in all cases between citizens of different states in which the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000.24 While the statute has changed slightly over
the years-generally to increase the amount-in-controversy requirement-the
diversity requirements have remained unchanged.25
Scholars and courts advance several reasons to explain the creation of
diversity jurisdiction. First, and most prevalent, Congress feared that state
judges, who are susceptible to pressures of the state electorate, would show
prejudice against out-of-state litigants.2 6 Justice Bradley explained that "the
very object of giving to the national courts jurisdiction.., in controversies
between citizens of different States was to institute independent tribunals
19. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (describing
minimal diversity as "diversity of citizenship between two or more claimants, without regard to
the circumstance that other rival claimants may be co-citizens").
20. See id. (describing the requirements for minimal diversity).
21. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (creating federal district and circuit courts
and authorizing diversity jurisdiction).
22. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (limiting the federal
diversity statute to parties with complete diversity).
23. See id. ("If there be two or more joint plaintiffs, and two or more joint defendants,
each of the plaintiffs must be capable of suing each of the defendants, in the courts of the United
States, in order to support the jurisdiction.").
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (amended 1996) (raising the amount-in-controversy
requirement to $75,000).
25. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3, at 304 (4th ed. 2003) (noting
that the amount-in-controversy requirement increased over the years from its original amount of
$500, to $10,000 in 1958, to $50,000 in 1988, to its present amount of $75,000 in 1996).
26. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis ofDiversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483,493-95 (1928) (noting that the original reason for the creation ofdiversityjurisdiction was
out-of-state businesses' fears of local prejudices).
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which... would be unaffected by local prejudices and sectional views. ... 07
Other scholars suggest that Congress was concerned with state judges who
were unqualified 8 or dependent on state legislatures for reappointment.29 This
competence rationale garners support from the fact that many litigants with
complex matters often prefer federal district courts for fear that the state court
judges will misinterpret the facts or the law.30 Finally, former Chief Justice
Taft claimed Congress created diversity jurisdiction to ease the fears of
investors who were hesitant to get involved in a foreign state where judicial
disputes could be inherently biased against them. 3' Neither the Framers nor
Congress officially endorsed any of these reasons, and critics of diversity
jurisdiction heavily scrutinize each of them.
III. Recent Developments and the Diversity Debate
Since the creation of diversity jurisdiction, debate rages over whether it is
worth the trouble (the Constitution, after all, merely authorizes Congress to
provide for diversity jurisdiction, and does not require it). One side argues for
the complete abolition of diversity, arguing that the reasons for its existence,
even if originally sound, are no longer valid.32 The other side supports
retention, arguing that the original reasons for diversity jurisdiction still exist.
33
27. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1882).
28. See Friendly, supra note 26, at 497-98 (acknowledging the belief at the time of
creation of diversity jurisdiction that many state court judges were less than competent).
29. See George C. Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity
Jurisdiction?, 44 A.B.A. J. 243, 244 (1958) (noting that state judges are not independent
because they are elected by the public and must rely on the legislature to set their salaries and
terms).
30. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Sligh, 1 H. & McH. 434, 437 (Md. 1772) (demonstrating an
example of a state court judge who found the matter too complicated and had to seek outside
assistance to reach a resolution).
31. See William H. Taft, Possible andNeededReforms in the Administration ofJustice in
the Federal Courts, in 47 REP. A.B.A. 250, 259 (1922) ("[N]o single element in our
governmental system has done so much to secure capital for the legitimate development of
enterprises throughout the West and South as the existence of federal courts there, with a
jurisdiction to hear diverse citizenship cases.").
32. See Richard Allan, Ddmarche or Destruction of the Federal Courts-A Response to
Judge Friendly's Analysis of Federal Jurisdiction, 40 BROOK. L. REv. 637, 650-56 (1974)
(arguing for elimination of diversity jurisdiction); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts andthe
American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 4-49 (1968) (same); Robert W. Kastenmeier &
Michael J. Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 311-18 (1979) (same).
33. See Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of
Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 193-94 (1929) (arguing for retention of diversity
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Most scholars agree that the primary reason for the creation of diversity
jurisdiction was the fear of bias against out-of-state litigants.34 Those in favor
of diversity jurisdiction argue that this problem existed at the time of creation,
and it still exists today. 35 The American Law Institute (ALl) has noted that,
with our increasingly mobile society, these concerns are misplaced: Prejudice
against out-of-state residents is the last prejudice we should worry about.36 The
ALl argues that state court judges are more likely to base prejudices on race,
religion, or a whole host of grounds, but not geography.37 On the other hand,
the ALI concedes that regional bias still exists, to some degree, against people
from distant parts of the country.38 The ALl also acknowledges the likelihood
of a local "court house gang" advantage for state residents.39
One scholar indicated that federal judges are qualitatively superior, noting
the importance of having this option for complex disputes between citizens of
different states. 40 The ALl added:
[A]lthough the out-of-stater cannot rightfully demand perfection in
procedural matters, there have been in some states such infirmities in
practice and procedure as to jeopardize the fairness of adjudication....
Nor can the fact be ignored that some state courts, largely centered in great
metropolitan areas, are so congested that justice to litigants, including out-
of-staters, is unconscionably delayed. Although federal courts in these same
areas face similar problems, they have on the whole resolved them more
effectively.
4 1
jurisdiction); John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 403,
413-14 (1979) (same); John J. Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U. L.
REv. 407, 408-13 (1956) (same).
34. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting that the most prevalent reason for
the creation of diversity jurisdiction is preventing bias against out-of-state litigants).
35. See 13B CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (2006) (noting that many supporters of the retention of
diversity jurisdiction believe bias against out-of-state litigants exists today in state courts).
36. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts, Official Draft, 106 (1969) [hereinafter ALl] ("[N]one of the significant
prejudices that beset our society today begins or ends when a state line is traversed.").
37. Id. (commenting that religious, racial, and economic concerns are much more pressing
than citizenship within a state).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that state judges are often not as
capable of handling complex litigation matters as federal judges).
41. ALl, supra note 36, at 107-08.
WILL THE REAL REAL PARTY IN INTEREST PLEASE STAND UP? 683
Several indisputable factors support this argument: Federal judges are
appointed for life, they are free to comment on the evidence, and they often
have far superior resources than state judges.42
The final argument, advanced by Justice Taft, is that the free flow of
capital throughout our nation necessitates diversity jurisdiction.43 What
matters, for the sake of this argument, is not whether diversity jurisdiction is
actually necessary for the equal administration of justice in state disputes but
whether businesses perceive diversity to be necessary. 44 Most businesses seem
to have little fear of state court prejudices in deciding whether to expand their
operations, but it is hard to know how much the existence of diversity
jurisdiction factors into their decision.45
Scholars and judges also advance practical arguments both for and against
diversity jurisdiction. For instance, Justice Frankfurter argued that diversity
jurisdiction creates significant congestion in the federal courts.46 But recent
reports show diversity cases now represent only about twenty percent of the
civil cases on district court dockets,47 so it would appear that legislation
increasing the amount-in-controversy requirement cured much of this
congestion.48
42. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 35, at 359 (describing the reasons why
federal judges may be better equipped to handle complex litigation matters).
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (arguing that diversity jurisdiction is
important to assure businesses that they can invest in a foreign state without fear of facing
biased local judges).
44. See Taft, supra note 31, at 259 (commenting on the considerations of businesses). He
notes:
The material question is not so much whether the justice administered is actually
impartial and fair, as it is whether it is thought to be so by those who are
considering the wisdom of investing their capital in states where that capital is
needed for the promotion of enterprises and industrial and commercial progress.
Id.
45. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 35, at 362-63 (noting that there is no way
to really know how much the existence of diversity jurisdiction factors into business decisions
without completely abolishing it to find out).
46. See Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 352 U.S. 874, 874-75 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("These diversity litigations place ... an undue burden upon the federal courts in
their ability to dispose expeditiously of other litigation which can be properly brought only in
the federal courts."); see also Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("For the last ten years the proportion of diversity cases has greatly
increased, so that it is safe to say that diversity cases are now taking at least half of the time that
the District Courts are devoting to civil cases.").
47. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-2, Cases Commenced, by Basis of
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, (Mar. 31, 2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2002/
contents.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See supra note 25 (noting the increase in the amount-in-controversy requirement over
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Additionally, the ALI expressed concern that with the advent of the Erie
Doctrine,49 which requires federal courts sitting in diversity cases to apply the
underlying state's substantive law, diversity cases in federal courts waste time
because the state courts are the experts on state substantive law.50 The ALI also
argues that the diversion of potentially novel legal issues of state substantive
law to federal courts impedes the development of state law.5 On the other
hand, some scholars argue that the existence of concurrent jurisdiction between
state and federal courts creates a competition between the two that pressures
state courts into achieving a higher level of sophistication, ultimately leading to
elevated standards in each respective system.
52
All theories and practical arguments aside, change in the diversity law will
come through the courts or Congress. Many members of the judiciary have
been outspoken in their dislike for diversity jurisdiction. 3 Despite this, one of
the most recent diversity decisions in the Supreme Court, Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc.,54 indicates a willingness to expand the scope of
the years).
49. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in [federal question
cases], the law to be applied in any [diversity] case is the law of the State.").
50. See ALl, supra note 36, at 99-100 (arguing that it is wasteful to force federal courts to
attempt to become experts on matters of state substantive law).
51. See id. at 100 (noting that diversity jurisdiction keeps unsettled questions of state law
away from state courts).
52. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLuM. L.
REV. 489, 540 (1954) (noting the significant legal contributions to state law by federal judges
hearing diversity cases); see also John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73
YALE L. J. 7, 12 (1963) ("We need a duplicating experience to protect the flow of ideas.").
53. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (referring to "the mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system by the
unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction"); see also ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 37 (1955) ("In my judgment the greatest
contribution that Congress could make to the orderly administration of justice in the United
States would be to abolish the jurisdiction of the federal courts which is based solely on the
ground that the litigants are citizens of different states."). But see Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 194, 196 (1809) (supporting diversity jurisdiction). The Court noted:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the States will administerjustice
as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less
true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or
views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it
has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens
and a citizen, or between citizens of different States.
Id.
54. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,549 (2005) (holding
that, in diversity actions, if one plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement, other
plaintiffs that do not can be brought in under supplemental jurisdiction). InExxon, the Supreme
Court considered whether supplemental jurisdiction would extend the diversity court's reach to
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diversity. There, the Court, faced with interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367," 5 held
"that, where ... at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-
in-controversy requirement, § 1367 does authorize supplemental jurisdiction
over the claims of the other plaintiffs... even if those claims are for less than
the jurisdictional amount specified in the statute setting forth the requirements
for diversity jurisdiction. 5 6 The Court did not, however, go as far as saying
that nondiverse parties could be brought in through supplemental jurisdiction.57
Regardless of the Supreme Court's position on diversity jurisdiction, as long as
only minimal diversity is constitutionally required, only the position of
Congress truly matters. As the Court noted, "[w]hatever we say regarding the
scope ofjurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be changed
by Congress. 
5 8
Congress has opted to retain diversity jurisdiction in the face of recurring
proposals for its elimination.5 9 But Congress has modified diversity jurisdiction
over the years.60 While most of the reforms demonstrate an attempt to restrict
the scope of those cases eligible for diversity jurisdiction, 61 at least one recent
congressional effort shows an attempt to expand the scope of cases that can be
brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.62 No congressional
a claim by a minor's parents if the daughter met the amount-in-controversy requirement, but the
parents did not. Id. at 551. It noted that the purpose behind diversity jurisdiction was to
provide a neutral forum for out-of-state litigants. Id. at 553-54. The Court added that while
diverse parties that do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement may still need this
neutral forum, nondiverse parties have no need to be brought in under supplemental jurisdiction.
Id. at 555. The Court held that if all other elements of jurisdiction are met and at least one
plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 authorizes the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over other diverse parties that do not meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement. Id. at 549.
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (granting supplemental jurisdiction to certain classes of
cases that would not otherwise come under federal jurisdiction).
56. Exxon, 545 U.S. at 549.
57. See id. at 553 (declining to extend supplemental jurisdiction to nondiverse parties).
58. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
59. See 124 CONG. REc. 5008-09 (1978) (voting to abolish diversity jurisdiction,
although the bill never reached a vote in the Senate); 124 CONG. REc. 33,546-48 (1978) (same);
see also REP. OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., 39 (Apr. 2, 1990) (recommending the
abolishment of diversity jurisdiction, subject to narrowly defined exceptions).
60. See supra note 25 (describing the modifications to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 over the years).
61. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing how Congress has increased the
amount-in-controversy requirement three times since its creation); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(2) (2000) (abolishing the rule by which diversity was artificially created through the
appointment of an out-of-state administrator to bring the suit of one local person against
another).
62. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 12(2005)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) (2000) & 1453 (2000)) (expanding the subject
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reforms, though, have addressed the dispute over citizenship in cases involving
subrogated or assigned claims. As a result, courts have been forced to interpret
existing congressional legislation and develop working standards to guide
decisions on these questions.
IV. Classifications Used by the Courts to Distinguish Parties to a Suit
Courts generally classify parties to a lawsuit depending on the nature of
the interest the party has in the outcome of the suit. Courts vary on what
constitutes the minimum threshold of interest needed for a party to have its
citizenship considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The most
demanding rule is the real party in interest rule, followed by the capacity to sue
rule. Courts will almost never consider a party's citizenship if that party is only
a nominal party.63
A. Real Party in Interest Rule
The most demanding level of interest, required by some courts before they
will consider that party's citizenship,64 is the real party in interest rule. The real
party in interest is the person who has the right to come to court and seek relief,
as recognized by the law.6 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)6 6 invokes
this term, although this rule is more procedural than jurisdictional.67 Rule 17(a)
ensures the finality of a lawsuit and prevents a party that is entitled to recover
matter jurisdiction of federal courts over class actions where at least one plaintiff is diverse from
the defendant and where the amount-in-controversy exceeds $5,000,000).
63. See infra Part IV.C (describing how courts handle nominal parties).
64. See infra Part VII.C (noting the circuits that have adopted the real party in interest
rule).
65. See Charles E. Clark & Robert M. Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALE L.J.
259, 261 (1925) (defining what constitutes the real party in interest).
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (adopting the procedural real party in interest definition).
The rule states, in part:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a
party authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is brought ....
Id.
67. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 857, 861 n.4 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting that a rough symmetry exists between the jurisdictional and procedural rules, but
they do not serve the same purpose).
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from bringing a subsequent suit.68 On the other hand, the jurisdictional rule
intends to prevent collusive joinder to create or defeat diversity jurisdiction.69
The Third Circuit has indicated that a party is not the real party in interest in the
jurisdictional sense unless it is seeking to protect its own interests rather than
just fulfilling obligations to another party.7 °
Often, a party may have the capacity to sue, but the court will find that
jurisdiction does not exist because he is not the real party in interest. For
instance, guardians are extended the capacity to sue on behalf of minors
through many state statutes, but they have no claim to a favorable judgment for
the minor.71 Thus, they are not the real party in interest.
B. Capacity to Sue Rule
Some jurisdictions recognize a capacity to sue rule for determining
whether an agent's citizenship controls the diversity decision.72 The capacity to
sue is the right to come into court and to be heard.73 Moreover, "[c]apacity
relates to a party's personal or official right to litigate the issues presented by
the pleadings. ' 7 4 Whether a party has the capacity to sue will often turn on
whether there has been a valid legal transfer of interests.7 5
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) adopts the procedural capacity to
sue rule.76 The question of whether a party has the procedural capacity to sue is
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee's note on the 1966 amendment ("[T]he
modem function of the rule in its negative aspect is simply to protect the defendant against a
subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the
judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata.").
69. See Transcon. Oil Corp. v. Trenton Prods. Co., 560 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1977)
(finding that under the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1359, the court must look to the real parties in
interest to decide whose citizenship controls for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
70. See Airlines Reporting, 58 F.3d at 862 (noting that the plaintiff was the real party in
interest for procedural purposes but not for jurisdictional purposes because he was merely
fulfilling contractual obligations).
71. See infra Part VI.D (describing how courts handle the interests of guardians).
72. See infra Part VII.B (noting the circuits that have adopted the capacity to sue rule).
73. See United States v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 4 F.R.D. 510, 517 (D. Neb. 1945)
(distinguishing, by definition, capacity to sue from cause of action).
74. Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 428 (Iowa 1996).
75. See, e.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18, 24 (1930) (deciding whether Indiana
statutes properly conferred capacity to sue).
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (2000) (adopting the capacity to sue definition). The rule
states, in part:
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to
sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individual's domicile. The
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the same as the question of whether that party has the capacity to sue for
jurisdictional purposes. 7 This is different than the real party in interest rule
where a separate analysis is used for jurisdictional purposes. Many courts
regard a party with merely a capacity to sue as having less of an entitlement to
have his citizenship considered for diversity purposes.78 Even so, the Supreme
Court recognizes that while a party with capacity to sue may not have a claim to
the proceeds of the final judgment, he may still have a significant interest in the
outcome of the suit.
79
Often, when a party is the real party in interest, that party lacks the
capacity to bring suit.80 For example, a minor or a mentally incompetent person
who is injured in a car wreck is the real party in interest in the outcome of the
litigation, but he does not have the capacity to bring suit.8' Such a party needs
a surrogate (other than his lawyer) to stand in for him and make the important
decisions relating to the lawsuit. In most circumstances, the real party in
interest will also have the capacity to sue,8 2 although he may choose to assign
his claim rather than exercise his capacity.
capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under
which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be
determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held ....
Id.
77. See Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 328-29 (3d Cir. 1955) (using Rule 17(b) in a
jurisdictional context).
78. See infra Part VII.C (describing those circuits that require a party to be the real party
in interest for his citizenship to be considered in deciding whether diversity jurisdiction exists).
79. See Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1903) (describing the
interests held by a party with the capacity to sue). The Court noted that a party with the capacity
to sue:
[I]s liable for costs in the event of failure to recover and for attorneys' fees to those
he employs to bring the suit, and in the event of success, the amount recovered
must be held for disposal according to law, and if he does not pay the same over to
the parties entitled, he would be liable therefor[e] on his official bond.
Id.
80. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Tinsley Mill Vill., 294 S.E.2d 495,
497 (Ga. 1982) ("A party may have the capacity to sue without being the real party in interest.").
81. See Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 428 (Iowa 1996)
(describing how a party may not have the capacity to sue even if he has a valid cause of action).
82. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 28 (2007) (noting that the capacity to sue is "closely
allied to" being the real party in interest).
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C. Nominal Parties
Finally, situations arise where a party is named in a lawsuit but has no
interest in the outcome. 83 Often, these parties are not even required to be
present for the lawsuit to take place, but a technical rule requires their name to
be present in the record.8 4 For instance, in McSparran v. Weist,85 the guardian
was not actually litigating the suit, his name was only included because the
minor lacked capacity.86 Courts do not recognize such nominal parties for the
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Ultimately, these classifications are important because they may determine
whether a party can bring suit in the federal forum under diversity jurisdiction.
Courts are more likely to find that a party has been collusively joined if the
party holds a slight interest in the outcome of the litigation. In those instances,
§ 1359 deprives the federal court of its jurisdiction.
V. 28 US.C. § 1359-Congress's Attempt to Defeat Manufactured
Jurisdiction
Most courts choosing the real party in interest rule do so to prevent
collusive joinder, 88 which is more likely to occur under the capacity to sue
rule.89 To protect against collusive joinder, Congress passed 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359,90 which provides that "[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction of a
civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
83. See id. § 8 (defining nominal parties and describing their usual lack of interest in the
outcome of a lawsuit).
84. See Brown v. Jones, 134 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. App. 1939) (describing how nominal
parties are included as a mere technicality, not because they have any interest in the lawsuit).
85. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 869 (3d Cir. 1968) (holding that diversity
jurisdiction did not exist because it would offend § 1359).
86. See id. (noting that the plaintiff conceded that the guardian was merely a straw party).
87. See Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138, 143 (1885) (deciding to disregard the
citizenship of the nominal party); Transcon. Oil Corp. v. Trenton Prods. Co., 560 F.2d 94, 102
(2d Cir. 1977) (same).
88. See infra Part VII.C (describing the rationale behind the Eighth and Second Circuits'
adoption of the real party in interest rule).
89. See infra notes 166, 168 and accompanying text (describing the fear of some courts
that collusive joinder is more likely to occur under the capacity to sue rule).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) (forbidding collusive joinder to create or defeat diversity
jurisdiction).
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court."9 1 This statute, based on the original assignee clause of the Judiciary Act
of 1789,92 ensures that federal courts only hear those cases properly brought
93within their jurisdiction. Parties often invoke this statute in cases where a
resident appoints a nonresident solely for the purpose of creating grounds for
removal to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 94 Generally, the party
opposing removal raises the § 1359 challenge, thereby placing the burden of
proof on the party seeking removal to overcome the presumption against the
federal court's exercise ofjurisdiction.
95
While this protection may be good in theory, it is infrequently used in
practice. Federal courts usually only look for glaring instances of collusion and
rarely inquire into the motives of the parties involved.96 On the other hand,
some courts find that this lack of inquiry is based on "thin and rather elusive
authority."07  Regardless, § 1359 has proven relatively ineffective as a
protection against collusion.98 In practice, if a representative merely holds a
valid legal appointment to his position, the federal court will accept that his
appointment is not in violation of § 1359.99 For this reason, more cases get into
federal courts under diversity jurisdiction where the diverse party merely has
the capacity to sue but is not the real party in interest. The decision of which
91. Id.
92. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1359 (West 2007) (revision notes and legislative reports) (noting
that the original assignee clause "is a jumble of legislative jargon").
93. See Sowell v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449,453 (1925) (noting that the original
purpose behind the assignee clause, replaced by § 1359, was to "prevent the conferring of
jurisdiction on the federal courts, on grounds of diversity of citizenship, by assignment, in cases
where it would not otherwise exist").
94. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 869 (3d Cir. 1968) (describing the party
appointed to bring suit as a "straw party").
95. See id. at 875 (stating that the burden of proof rests with the party invoking diversity
jurisdiction to show that its exercise is proper in this instance).
96. See Mecom v. Fitzimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (1931) ("[I]t is clear that
the motive or purpose that actuated any or all of these parties in procuring a lawful and valid
appointment is immaterial upon the question of identity or diversity of citizenship."); see also
Note, Manufactured Federal Diversity Jurisdiction and § 1359, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 706, 708
(1969) (noting that motive is mostly irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes).
97. Vallentine v. Taylor Inv. Co., 305 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (D. Colo. 1969) (citation
omitted); Dougherty v. Oberg, 297 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D. Minn. 1969).
98. See Cohan & Tate, supra note 1 at 209 (noting that there have been very few instances
of courts actually finding a violation of § 1359).
99. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Phila.& W. R. Co., 180 F.2d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 1950), overruled
on other grounds by McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968) (disregarding
motive because the administrator was properly appointed); Greene v. Goodyear, 112 F. Supp.
27, 28 (M.D. Pa. 1953) (same).
690
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rule to choose is still left up to the federal district courts, with little guidance
from Congress or the Supreme Court.
VI. Occurrences of the Diversity Dispute
Diversity disputes arise in several circumstances, requiring courts to
decide whether diversity exists. Most of these occurrences involve a party with
a valid cause of action who is, for some reason, incapable of litigating the claim
on his own. For example, the real party in interest may lack the capacity to sue,
as with wards, or it may be a corporation that finds it more efficient to assign its
claims to a third party who is better equipped to litigate such claims.
A. Executors and Administrators
Generally, where an executor or an administrator of an estate is party to an
action in federal courts, the executor or administrator's citizenship controls the
diversity decision.'00 There are two exceptions to this general rule.'01 First, if a
nominal party is merely serving as a conduit for a lawsuit, that party's
citizenship will not be used. 0 2 Second, where a statute allows recovery by
either the administrator or the beneficiaries, the courts regard a suing
administrator as a nominal party and disregard his citizenship.
0 3
The Supreme Court decisions make it difficult to discern which rule the
Court relied upon in deciding that the citizenship of the executor controls. The
second exception would indicate that mere capacity to sue is not enough
because if there is a statute giving the capacity to sue to either the beneficiaries
or the executor, the executor is deemed a nominal party whose citizenship is
disregarded if he sues. 1' 4 The Supreme Court has not addressed this
100. See Annotation, Citizenship of Executor or Administrator as Test of Diversity of
Citizenship for Purposes of Jurisdiction of Federal Court, 77 A.L.R. 910 (1932) (Supp. 136
A.L.R. 938 (1942)) (giving a collation of cases supporting the proposition that the executor or
administrator's citizenship controls in diversity actions).
101. See Cohan & Tate, supra note 1, at 216 (noting the exceptions to the general rule with
executors and administrators).
102. See Walden v. Skinner, 101 U.S. 577, 589 (1879) (noting that ifthe executor is a mere
nominal party, the citizenship of the deceased trustee should govern).
103. See Thames v. Mississippi ex rel. Shoemaker, 117 F.2d 949, 952 (5th Cir. 1941)
(ruling that, where a Mississippi statute gives the right to sue to either the administrator or the
beneficiaries, if the administrator sues, he will be treated as a nominal party).
104. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting an exception to the general rule).
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exception. 10 5 In cases where the Supreme Court actually ruled that the
citizenship of the executor or administrator controls, the Court's language
mentions both real party in interest and capacity to sue as reasons for its
decision. 106 The lower court opinions reflect this contradictory language, as
they rely on both the real party in interest rule
10 7 and the capacity to sue rule'0 8
in diversity cases involving executors and administrators. Surprisingly, the rule
for executors and administrators is more consistent than in any other area. The
District Court of Colorado noted that "[o]utside of [executors and
administrators] we find no general rule."'10 9
B. Trustees
The diversity problem also arises in cases involving trustees. Most courts
find that if a trustee is party to the action and exercises real powers over the
trust, the federal courts should consider his citizenship in the diversity
decision.1° This consideration is based upon the fact that normally a trustee is
the real party in interest because he represents the interests of the
105. See Mississippi ex rel. Shoemaker v. Thames, 314 U.S. 630, 630 (1941) (denying
certiorari).
106. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1931) (noting, first,
that Mecom's citizenship is determinative because he was the real party in interest, but then
noting that the facts from Mexican Central Railway Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903), are
applicable here). In Eclanan, the Court ruled that if state law gives the guardian the "right to
bring suit" (or capacity to sue), then his citizenship controls, even if he is bringing the suit on
someone else's behalf Mexican Central Ry., 187 U.S. at 434; see also Childress v. Emory, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 530, 532 (1823) (noting that the citizenship of executors and administrators
controls because they are "the real parties in interest," and they are "capable of suing and being
sued").
107. See Schneider v. Eldredge, 125 F. 638, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1903) ("[T]his court will take
into consideration the actual party in interest ... as though he were the original defendant.");
Chambers v. Anderson, 58 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1932) (considering the administratrix's
citizenship because she was the real party in interest).
108. See Dodge v. Perkins, 7 F. Cas. 798, 799 (D. Mass. 1827) (No. 3,954) (noting that
even though the administrator was suing in his representative capacity, "he sues in his own right
as a citizen"); Roach's Adm'r v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 258 S.W. 300, 301 (Ky. Ct. App.
1924) ("It is the residence of the parties actually before the court that gives jurisdiction, and
where a party sues in a representative capacity, it is his residence, and not the residence of those
he represents, that controls.").
109. Vallentine v. Taylor Inv. Co., 305 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (D. Colo. 1969).
110. See Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458,464 (1980) (finding that a trustee is a
real party to the controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction when he has the power to
"hold, manage, and dispose of assets for the benefit of others."); see also Dodge v. Tulleys, 144
U.S. 451,456 (1892) (considering the citizenship of the trustee). See generally 32A AM. JUR.
2D Federal Courts § 894 (2007).
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beneficiary.1 1' On the other hand, if the trustee is a "naked trustee...
[acting] as [a] mere conduit[] for a remedy flowing to others," the diversity
decision turns on the citizenship of the underlying party rather than the
trustee's citizenship." 12 A trustee, however, is not necessarily a "mere
conduit" just because the remedy is going to others. 13 Although most
Supreme Court rulings on the issue of trustees are at least couched in terms of
deciding who is the real party in interest, some lower courts have still
interpreted these cases to allow for the adoption of the capacity to sue rule.'
1 4
C. Receivers
The diversity dispute also arises in cases involving receivers. Generally,
in an action by or against a receiver serving on behalf of a corporation, the
receiver's citizenship matters for diversity jurisdiction. 1 5  The court
disregards the citizenship of the underlying corporation or individual." 6 As
with trustees, lower courts faced with receivers as parties have relied on the
real party in interest rule in some instances' 17 and the capacity to sue rule in
111. See Bergkamp v. N.Y. Guardian Mortgagee Corp., 667 F. Supp. 719, 724 (D. Mont.
1987) ("[T]he trustee represents the interests of the beneficiary so that the trustee alone is the
real party in interest.").
112. Navarro, 446 U.S. at 465; see also Boon's Heirs v. Chiles, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 205,207
(1834) (finding that where a suit is filed in the name of the trustee who is officially the holder of
the legal title but has no knowledge of the lawsuit, his citizenship is not considered in the
diversity decision); Bogue v. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co., 193 F. 728, 734 (S.D. Iowa 1912)
("[S]uch is not the rule where a person is a mere agent or trustee for the use of another. In such
a case the citizenship of the beneficiary controls.").
113. See Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 510,514 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (finding that a trustee still had powers and authority under the law, even though he was
acting on behalf of and for the benefit of the beneficiaries).
114. See infra Part VII.B and accompanying notes (describing how some circuits have
interpreted the Supreme Court rulings to require only the capacity to sue rule for resolution of
the diversity dispute).
115. See Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429,434(1903) (citing New Orleans
v. Gaines 's Administrator for the same proposition); New Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S.
595, 606 (1891) (including receivers in the list of parties whose citizenship controls in the
diversity decision). But see Chapman v. St. Louis & S.W. Ry. Co., 71 F. Supp. 1017,1018-19
(N.D. Tex. 1947) (departing from the general rule and disregarding the citizenship of the
receiver for public policy reasons).
116. See Coal & Iron Ry. v. Reherd, 204 F. 859, 883 (4th Cir. 1913) (disregarding the
citizenship of the individual); Barber v. Powell, 22 S.E.2d 214,214 (N.C. 1942) (disregarding
the citizenship of the corporation).
117. See Farlow v. Lea, 8 F. Cas. 1017,1018 (N.D. Ohio 1877) (No. 4,649) (findingthat
the receiver, not the corporation he was representing, was the real party in interest to the lawsuit,
so his citizenship should control).
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others. 118 This situation arises most often when a receiver takes control of a
bankrupt company for the benefit of the creditors.1"9 If tortious conduct occurs
after the takeover, the diversity dispute would not arise because the receiver
would also be the real party in interest. 120 On the other hand, the dispute would
arise if the conduct took place before the receiver took control as a result of the
actions of the bankrupt company. If the receiver litigates the case, his
citizenship may not control. The decision would ultimately depend on whether
the conduct occurred in a jurisdiction that relies on the real party in interest rule
or in one following the capacity to sue rule. A uniform rule would prevent
contradictory conclusions from circuits with different rules.
D. Guardians
Cases often arise where the parties are in dispute over whether a court
should consider the citizenship of a guardian or a minor (or an incapacitated
party). Two Supreme Court opinions direct that the guardian's own citizenship
is what counts for purposes of the diversity decision. 121 One lower court
opinion, evidencing the lack of clarity in these decisions, noted that "[t]he cases
are confusing and the Circuits are split.' 22 Illustrative of this confusion, many
courts have ruled that it is the citizenship of the ward, not the guardian, that
controls. 123 Furthermore, this line of cases produced one of the first circuit
118. See Davies v. Lathrop, 12 F. 353,359 (S.D.N.Y. 1882) ("[The defendant] confided to
him the responsibility of defending the suit, and this court has a right to deal with his personal
citizenship on the question of removal."); see also Bogue v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 193 F.
728, 734 (S.D. Iowa 1912). There, the court noted:
The citizenship of [a] ... receiver determines the jurisdiction, because such an
officer has the legal title under his appointment by judicial proceedings. But such
is not the rule where a person is a mere agent or trustee for the use of another. In
such a case the citizenship of the beneficiary controls.
Id.
119. See Cohan & Tate, supra note 1, at 219 (describing a common occurrence of the
diversity dispute with receivers).
120. Id.
121. See Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429,434(1903) (citing New Orleans
v. Gaines's Administrator for the same proposition); New Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S.
595, 606 (1891) (including guardians in the list of parties whose citizenship controls in the
diversity decision).
122. Vallentine v. Taylor Inv. Co., 305 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (D. Colo. 1969).
123. See Elliot v. Krear, 466 F. Supp. 444, 446-47 (E.D. Va. 1979) (finding that the
citizenship of the ward, not the guardian, controls for deciding whether diversity jurisdiction
exists); Dunlap ex rel. Wells v. Buchanan, 567 F. Supp. 1435, 1436 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (same);
see also ALI, supra note 36, at 10-12, 117-19 (proposing that courts should view the guardian
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court opinions strongly advocating the capacity to sue rule in very clear terms.
In Fallat v. Gouran,124 the court found "that the other courts have
misinterpreted the true basis of diversity and that when the other courts speak in
terms of real party in interest, they really mean to base the decision on capacity
to sue."'125  On the other hand, many courts finding that the guardian's
citizenship controls still rely upon, or at least speak in terms of, the real party in
interest rule.126  Considering the frequency with which children lacking
capacity to sue become victims of tortious conduct, this area needs a clear rule
governing whose citizenship should control.
E. Assignments
Assignment of interest can also give rise to a dispute over whose
citizenship controls. An assignment occurs when one party passes all of its
legal interest in a certain property to another party. 127 Because some parties
assign claims solely to manipulate jurisdiction, courts disagree on whether such
assignments can serve as a basis for diversity jurisdiction. 128  The ALI,
recognizing this problem, proposed a statutory amendment that would eliminate
the practice of assigning claims to prevent removal on diversity grounds.
29
Federal courts have regularly rejected the real party in interest rule as grounds
for ignoring the citizenship of the assignee,130 often stating that the assignee
and the ward as having the same citizenship).
124. See infra note 157 (describing the facts and holding of Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d
325 (3d Cir. 1955)).
125. Cohan & Tate, supra note 1, at 225.
126. See Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1949) (using the
minor's citizenship because he was the real party in interest); Eckman, 187 U.S. at 434
(referencing the real party in interest rule in a situation involving a guardian).
127. See Cohan & Tate, supra note 1, at 227 (describing the circumstances giving rise to an
assignment of property).
128. See Lisenby v. Patz, 130 F. Supp. 670, 674 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (finding that if the
assignment is otherwise valid, the motives for the transfer are immaterial, and also noting that
Congress, not the courts, should correct this evil). But see King ex rel. King v. McMillan, 252
F. Supp. 390, 392 (D.C.S.C. 1966) (finding that if any fraud or collusion existed in connection
with the assignment, the state court was the proper forum for resolution of the dispute).
129. See ALI, supra note 36, at 22-23 (proposing, in § 1307(b), that assignment be ignored
if it is used to create or destroy diversity jurisdiction).
130. See Provident Sav. Life Assurance Soc'y v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635,641 (1885) (rejecting
the idea that a mere colorable assignment and a diverse plaintiff who was not the real party in
interest were sufficient to dismiss the case from federal court); Krenzien v. United Servs. Life
Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 243, 245 (D. Kan. 1954) (finding that an assignment to a party who was
not the real party in interest but who was diverse was sufficient to create diversity jurisdiction).
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 675 (2008)




A final scenario involves subrogated claims where the subrogee is of a
different citizenship than the subrogor. This circumstance most often arises in the
insurance field, where an insurance company will compensate the insured for his
loss, then become subrogated to the rights of the insured against the tortfeasor.
32
Here, the general rule is very similar to the rule with executors and
administrators-the subrogee's citizenship controls.' 33 Most states only allow the
subrogee to sue by himself as the real party in interest if he has paid the insured's
entire amount lost,134 although some states do not make such a distinction.
35
Subrogated claims arise on a fairly regular basis, and a uniform rule is needed to
prevent contradictory outcomes based on jurisdiction. Currently, parties desiring
a federal forum are likely to forum shop because some circuits require a greater
level of interest before a subrogee's citizenship can control.
VII. Circuit Split
A. The Supreme Court Rulings Have Not Decisively Resolved the Issue
The Supreme Court's diversity precedents do not resolve whether the real
party in interest or capacity rule is preferable, and indeed its decisions on related
131. See Rosecrans v. William S. Lozier, Inc., 142 F.2d 118, 124 (8th Cir. 1944) (ruling
that even if the assignee were only a party in order to obtain a judgment and then turn over the
proceeds, his citizenship would still control); Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 82
F. Supp. 274, 276 (E.D.S.C. 1949) (finding that if the assignees were "really [] proper parties
and [had] legitimate standing in the court" their citizenship could create diversity).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 369 (1949)
(describing the circumstances giving rise to the subrogated claim).
133. See New Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595,606 (1891) (including subrogees
in the list of parties whose citizenship controls in the diversity decision); Cont'l Cas. Co. v.
Ohio Edison Co., 126 F.2d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1942) ("One subrogated to the rights of another
may stand in the Federal Courts upon his own citizenship, regardless of the citizenship of the
person to whose rights he is subrogated.").
134. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tel-Mor Garage Corp., 92 F. Supp. 445, 446
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (finding that an insurer who has paid the full amount of the loss is the only real
party in interest and must stand on its own citizenship).
135. See, e.g., Cont'l Cas., 126 F.2d at 425-26 (finding that the subrogee's citizenship
controlled despite the fact that he only partially compensated the injured party).
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matters provide support for both sides. In New Orleans v. Gaines's
Administrator,136 the Court emphasized that the citizenship of parties with
assigned claims should control in diversity cases.' 37 The Court stated that the
only time this rule is not applicable is when there is a mere nominal party, whose
name is included in the lawsuit for the sole purpose of creating diversity
jurisdiction 138 (Congress later codified this idea in 28 U.S.C. § 1359)., 39 The
Court said that in circumstances involving manufactured diversity, the citizenship
of the real party in interest controls for the diversity decision. 140 It did not,
however, say what to do in circumstances involving a party who is not the real
party in interest, but who has legitimate capacity to sue and is not a mere nominal
party.
Later cases exhibited the same lack of clarity. In Mexican CentralRailway
Co. v. Eclnan,14 1 the Court noted that:
136. See New Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595, 606 (1891) (ordering courts in
federal litigation to respect states' characterizations of guardians as determinative of which party
is the real party in interest). In Gaines's Administrator, the city of New Orleans sold land to a
private party, who then sold the same land to various parties. Id. at 597. Gaines, claiming that
the property was rightfully hers all along, brought a suit against the city on behalf of the parties
that would otherwise be liable to her. Id. at 600. In addressing the assignments of error, the
Court first decided that the circuit court's jurisdiction was not founded upon diversity but upon
Gaines's equitable right to sue the city. Id. at 605. Second, the Court found that the assignment
of the individual parties' rights to Gaines did not destroy her subrogated right to sue the city.
Id. at 606. In so ruling, the Court noted that representatives "may stand on their own citizenship
in the federal courts irrespective[] of the citizenship of the persons whom they represent." Id. It
distinguished instances where a party to a suit is a mere nominal party, in which case the
citizenship of the real party in interest is considered. Id. at 607. Finally, the Court found that
there was an express warranty in the sales made by the city, and no fraud was proven. Id. at
608-09.
137. See id. at 606 ("[W]e have repeatedly held that representatives may stand upon their
own citizenship in the federal courts irrespective[] of the citizenship of the persons whom they
represent,-such as executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, receivers .... ").
138. See id. (noting that cases brought in federal court based solely on a nominal party's
diversity are evils sought to be avoided).
139. See supra Part V and accompanying notes (describing the purpose and history of 28
U.S.C. § 1359).
140. See Gaines's Adm 'r, 138 U.S. at 607 ("[In situations involving a nominal party,] the
real party in interest is taken into account on the question of citizenship.").
141. Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429,434 (1903) (ruling that a guardian
has a legal right to bring an action in his own name, and his citizenship controls for purposes of
deciding whether diversity jurisdiction exists). In Eckman, a guardian sued Mexican Railway
Company on behalf of a minor who was injured due to the Company's alleged negligence. Id.
at 429-31. The Court acknowledged its previous cases held that actions in federal court could
be brought in any district where either the plaintiff or the defendant resided, so the only question
for consideration was whether the plaintiff here was the guardian or the minor. Id. at 432. The
Court then reaffirmed the principle from New Orleans v. Gaines's Administrator that if a party
is merely nominal, the citizenship of the real party in interest is considered for diversity
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If in the state of the forum the general guardian has the right to bring suit in
his own name as such guardian, and does so, he is to be treated as the party
plaintiff so far as Federal jurisdiction is concerned, even though suit might
have been instituted in the name of the ward by guardian ad litem or next
friend. He is liable for costs in the event of failure to recover and for
attorneys' fees to those he employs to bring the suit, and in the event of
success, the amount recovered must be held for disposal according to law,
and if he does not pay the same over to the parties entitled, he would be
liable therefor[e] on his official bond.
142
Here, the Court seemingly indicates that mere capacity to sue is enough for a
party's citizenship to control the diversity decision. The Court's reasoning
acknowledges that even a party that merely has capacity to sue may still have a
significant stake in the outcome of the case. Thus, it would be unfair to ignore
that party's citizenship, assuming diversity jurisdiction is a desirable goal in
this instance.
In Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 14 3 the Court appeared to reverse
course, noting that because Mecom was the real party in interest, his citizenship
controls for diversity purposes. 144 But the Court went on to justify this ruling
by stating that the rule laid down in Eckman was applicable here. 14 5 This
purposes. Id. at 433 (citing New Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595,606 (1891)). But,
the Court said that when a guardian has the legal right to sue in his own name, his citizenship
controls. Id. at 434. The Court reasoned that, while the guardian may not be the real party in
interest, he still may be liable to the real party in interest if he fails to recover on that party's
claim. Id.
142. Id. at 434.
143. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 186(1931) (finding that a suit by
an administrator on behalf of the state should have been dismissed from federal court because
the citizenship of the administrator, not the decedent, should control for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction). In Mecom, Fitzsimmons Drilling Company attempted to have a wrongful death
suit removed to federal court because, while the administrator was a nondiverse party, the
decedent was diverse. Id. at 184-85. The Court found that federal courts have jurisdiction over
suits by executors and administrators if they are diverse, regardless of the decedent's citizenship.
Id. at 186. The Court reasoned that the administrator, often required to bring the suit under state
statute, is the real party in interest. Id. The Mecom Court found that the rationale from Ecknan
applied here-a legal right to bring suit brings with it the right to have one's own citizenship
control for diversity purposes. Mecom, 284 U.S. at 187. The Court rejected Fitzsimmons'
assertion that the administrator was chosen solely for the purpose of defeating diversity, noting
that the motive of parties in procuring a lawful appointment is immaterial to the diversity
question. Id. at 189.
144. See id. at 186 ("[H]e is the real party in interest and his citizenship, rather than that of
the beneficiaries, is determinative of federal jurisdiction. This we think is the correct view.").
145. See id. at 187 (restating the rationale from Eckman and applying it to the present
situation).
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confuses the rule chosen in Mecom because the Eckman language was more
indicative of a capacity to sue rule rather than a real party in interest rule. '
46
Later, in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert,147 this same
confusing rule emerged. The Court again said that diversity did exist because
the petitioner was "not merely a nominal defendant, but... [was] the real party
in interest." 48 The Court followed its previous rationales, giving only the two
extreme guidelines in the diversity determination. Again, the Court spoke in
terms of the real party in interest but cited to the Eckman decision which
seemed to turn on capacity to sue.
14 9
The Supreme Court rulings make abundantly clear that courts should focus
on the citizenship of the real party in interest, but they should not consider the
citizenship of a nominal party. Parties with mere capacity to sue lie somewhere
between the two, but the Court has yet to draw the line.
The lack of specificity by the Court has divided the circuits. The First
Circuit acknowledged the split in Pramco, LLC ex rel. CFSC Consortium v.
San Juan Bay Marina, Inc. 150 There, the court noted that circuits vary on
146. See supra note 141 (describing the rationale relied on by the Court in Eckman).
147. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 51 (1954) (noting that the real
party in interest's citizenship controls the decision of whether diversity jurisdiction exists). In
Lumbermen 's, two residents from the same state were involved in a car accident, but the injured
party sued the negligent party's nondiverse insurance company in federal court. Id. at 49. The
Court noted that the insurance company was not merely a nominal defendant but was the real
party in interest because the company would have to pay any judgment against the negligent
party. Id. at 51. The Court rejected the claim that the negligent driver was an indispensable
party because the court could give a final decree without his joinder. Id. Finally, the Court
rejected the insurance company's call for the federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction
here, as the Court noted this was a case that fell squarely within the lower court's congressional
grant ofjurisdiction. Id. at 52. In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter noted that this was an
abuse of diversity jurisdiction that "has no business in federal court." Id. at 56 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). He then went on to give a scathing review of diversity jurisdiction in general,
which he saw as clogging up federal courts. Id. at 57 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 51.
149. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867,870 (3d Cir. 1968) (noting the confusing rule
that emerged when the court referred to the Eckman case with approval but characterized the
guardian as the real party in interest).
150. See Pramco, LLC ex rel. CFSC Consortium v. San Juan Bay Marina, Inc., 435 F.3d
51, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the lower court must first determine whether there are any
nondiverse members in the LLC before the First Circuit can determine whether that party's
citizenship matters for jurisdictional purposes). In Pramco, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit considered whether the district court had proper jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a
settlement agreement. Id. at 54-55. Here, the plaintiffs were both LLCs, and the defendants
were citizens of Puerto Rico. Id. The Pramco court noted that the citizenship of an LLC is
determined by the citizenship of all of its members. Id. It then noted that the agent's citizenship
may matter in this situation, and while the circuits split over this issue, it was an issue of first
impression for this court. Id. The court then remanded to the district court to determine the
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whether an agent's citizenship should matter. 5 ' While acknowledging
arguments for both the real party in interest rule and the capacity to sue rule, the
court determined that the diversity issue was not ripe for determination and
remanded on other grounds to the lower court.1
52
B. Circuits Applying the Capacity to Sue Rule
Although many variations exist among the circuit and district courts, two
general positions are apparent. The first, illustrated by the court in Hart v.
Bayer Corp.,' 53 finds the agent's citizenship to control if he has the capacity to
sue. 154 There, the court reasoned that if an agent has legal standing to sue or be
sued, then he has sufficient status for consideration of his citizenship.' 55 The
original intent of diversity jurisdiction supports this position, namely that a
party forcibly engaged in a lawsuit will fall victim to local bias in state court.156
This courtroom bias affects the party that is actually in the courtroom, acting
under his legal capacity to sue (the agent); therefore, his citizenship controls.
In Fallat v. Gouran, 57 the Third Circuit supported this position. The
court again focused on the agent or subrogee's legal capacity to sue in deciding
citizenship of each member of the LLC's. Id. at 56.
151. Id. at 55 (noting that the Eighth and Second Circuits believe an agent's citizenship is
not considered, while the Third Circuit disagrees and favors using the agent's citizenship).
152. Id. at 56 (remanding for determination of the citizenship of each member of the LLCs
involved in the litigation).
153. See Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247-48 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that if an
agent is in some way liable for the commission of a tort, his citizenship controls for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, despite the agency relationship). In Hart, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered whether the presence of an agent, joined in a lawsuit involving the
misrepresentation of pesticide chemicals, could create diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 242-43. The
lawsuit was brought in Mississippi, and all parties resided there except for the agent. Id. The
Hart court first found that the statute involved did not completely preempt all state or local
regulations of pesticides. Id. at 244. Second, the court found no indication of anything in the
language or legislative history that suggested preemption of local regulations, which would
create federal jurisdiction. Id. at 245. Finally, the Hart court found that for the agent to be
joined in the lawsuit, he would need some sort of direct, personal participation in the tort, and if
this was the case, then his citizenship controls for purposes of deciding whether diversity
jurisdiction exists. Id. at 246-47.
154. Id. at 247 (commenting that the agency relationship is irrelevant here).
155. Id. (noting that if an agent is directly liable to the extent that he is being joined in the
lawsuit, his citizenship controls for jurisdictional purposes).
156. See supra Part II and accompanying notes (describing the purpose behind the
congressional enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332).
157. See Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 326 (3d Cir. 1955) ("[I]t is not the citizenship of
the incompetent,.., which governs but the citizenship of the guardian, provided he has the
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whether his citizenship controls for diversity purposes. 158 Not only does this
position provide adequate protection to the foreign party, but it also aims to
defeat collusive efforts to create jurisdiction as prohibited by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359.159 It is not a complete protection, though, because presumably a party
could still artificially create jurisdiction by subrogating his claim to a diverse
agent with the capacity to sue.' 60 Competent district court judges, though,
would undoubtedly recognize these attempts.16 1 The Third Circuit later ruled,
in McSparran v. Weist,162 that the citizenship of the ward, rather than the
guardian, should control in the diversity determination. 163 The court, however,
capacity to sue."). In Fallat, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided whether, in a
lawsuit over an automobile accident, the citizenship of the nondiverse victim, or his diverse
guardian, controls for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 325-26. The Fallat court cited the
Supreme Court in New Orleans v. Gaines's Administrator for the proposition that
"'representatives may stand upon their own citizenship in the federal courts irrespectively of the
citizenship of the persons whom they represent."' Fallat, 220 F.2d at 326 (quoting New
Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595, 606-07 (1891)). Here, the Fallat court declined to
follow the view of the Eighth Circuit and instead held that presuming the guardian has the legal
capacity to sue, his citizenship, and not the citizenship of the represented party, should control
on the issue of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 327.
158. Id. at 327 ("Thus, the means for determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction in a
situation such as this is not by looking to the citizenship of the incompetent but to the
citizenship of the guardian, if he has capacity to sue.").
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) (prohibiting collusion among the parties for the purposes of
intentionally creating or defeating diversity jurisdiction).
160. See, e.g., Dweck v. Japan CBM Corp., 877 F.2d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing
a situation where an assignee brought a breach of contract claim even though he was not party to
the contract).
161. See, e.g., Green & White Constr. Co. v. Cormat Constr. Co., 361 F. Supp. 125, 128
(N.D. Ill. 1973) (finding a lack of diversity jurisdiction because the plaintiff was an assignee
that lacked any interest in the outcome of the lawsuit).
162. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (1968) (holding that diversityjurisdiction
did not exist because it would offend § 1359 and disapproving of Fallat v. Gouran to the extent
that it "indicates approval of manufactured diversity" (citation omitted)). In McSparran, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether a guardian's citizenship controlled in
a diversity suit on behalf of the ward, even though he acknowledged that his appointment was
solely for the purpose of creating diversity. Id. at 868-69. The court first acknowledged the
confusion resulting from the inconsistent Supreme Court rulings in these cases. Id. at 870. It
then distinguished this case, which did not consider whose citizenship controlled, but instead
whether the appointment of the guardian violated § 1359. Id. at 871. It noted that none of the
considerations that usually justify using the guardian's citizenship applied here because the
nominal guardian would relinquish all of his responsibilities at the end of the suit. Id. at 872.
The court then noted that despite the Supreme Court ruling in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling
Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931), the Court had difficulty entirely ignoring motive in determining
whether there was a violation of § 1359. McSparran, 402 F.2d at 874. Here, the court found
that the plaintiff did not adequately prove that diversity jurisdiction existed, so it dismissed the
case. Id. at 876.
163. Id. at 876 ("We hold therefore that the attempt to confer diversity jurisdiction in the
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distinguished Fallat because here the guardian was a mere "straw" party,'
64
which reduced his status to that of a "nominal party."'165 Based on these three
decisions, the capacity rule controls diversity decisions in cases arising in the
Third and Fifth Circuits.
C. Circuits Applying the Real Party in Interest Rule
On the other hand, several courts only consider an agent's citizenship
when the agent is the real party in interest. For instance, the Eighth Circuit, in
Associated Insurance Management Corp. v. Arkansas GeneralAgency, Inc. 166
found that "'the citizenship of the represented individuals control[s] for
diversity purposes [because] they are real and substantial parties to the
dispute.'
1 67
The Second Circuit in Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel, Inc.
68
took the same position. There, the court's decision turned on the fact that the
present case offends against § 1359. Jaffe... [is] hereby overruled, and Fallat v. Gouran is
disapproved to the extent that it indicates approval of 'manufactured' diversity.").
164. Id. at 871.
165. Id.
166. See Associated Ins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ark. Gen. Agency, Inc., 149 F.3d 794, 797 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the citizenship of the real party in interest controls for jurisdictional
purposes). In Associated Insurance, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered
whether the citizenship of the party suing under power of attorney or the citizenship of the
underlying party controls for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 796. The Associated
Insurance court said the citizenship of the real party in interest controls for diversity purposes.
Id. at 797. Here, the court decided that the lawsuit had merely been assigned to the collection
agency, and the agency did not have any real interest in the dispute. Id. at 797-98. Thus, the
court held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and the matter must be
dismissed. Id. at 798.
167. Id. at 798 (quoting Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 862, 862
(2d Cir. 1995)).
168. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that the citizenship of the real party to the dispute controls for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction). In Airlines Reporting, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered
whether the citizenship of a collection agency or the party on whose behalf it was suing
controlled forjurisdictional purposes. Id. at 859-60. The Airlines Reporting court relied on the
Supreme Court proposition that "'citizens' upon whose diversity a plaintiff grounds jurisdiction
must be real and substantial parties to the controversy." Id. at 861 (quoting Navarro Say. Ass'n
v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460 (1980)). The court was careful to distinguish between the
jurisdictional real party in interest rule, and the "real party in interest" rule set forth in Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17(a). Id. at 862. Here, the Airlines Reporting court found that the party alleging
diversity was merely an agent representing the interest of others, and for that reason, his
citizenship could not be considered. Id.
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agent was merely representing the interest of another party. 69 The court,
however, made sure to distinguish between its rule of looking to the real party
in interest for jurisdictional purposes, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(a), which requires that a lawsuit be brought in the name of the real party in
interest.170 Rule 17(a) is merely a procedural requirement that has no bearing
whatsoever on subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts. 171 The court noted
that, while there is a "'rough symmetry' between the 'real party in interest'
standard of Rule 17(a) and the rule that diversity jurisdiction depends upon the
citizenship of real parties to the controversy ... the two rules serve different
purposes and need not produce identical outcomes in all cases."'
172
So, the Second and Eighth Circuits would conduct a second inquiry,
independent of the Rule 17(a) procedural inquiry, as to who is the real party in
interest. 173 These courts would then use that party's citizenship for deciding
whether diversity jurisdiction exists.1
74
Most circuits would agree that if the agent, subrogee, or assignee is the
real party in interest, his citizenship controls in deciding whether diversity
jurisdiction exists. The split, however, occurs when it comes to agents that
merely have the capacity to sue but are not the real parties in interest.
VIII. Courts Should Adopt the Capacity to Sue Rule
A. It Is Time for Either the Supreme Court or Congress to Choose a
Uniform Rule
The determination of which rule to use in the diversity dispute will rarely
matter because a party with the capacity to sue is, in most instances, the real
party in interest as well. 175 Also, until recently there was "little reason to stir
169. Id. at 861 (using the real party in interest rule for the diversity decision).
170. See FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a) (describing how to determine the real party in interest for
procedural purposes).
171. See supra Part IV.A (describing the difference between the procedural and
jurisdictional identification of the real party in interest).
172. Airlines Reporting, 58 F.3d at 861 n.4 (quoting Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S.
458, 462 (1980)).
173. See supra notes 166, 168 and accompanying text (describing the process used by the
Eighth and Second Circuits for deciding whose citizenship controls for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction).
174. See id. and accompanying text (describing the approach used by the Eighth and
Second Circuits).
175. See Harper v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 36 F. 102, 104 (W.D. Va. 1887) (noting the
likelihood that a party with the capacity to sue is also a real party in interest). The court noted:
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otherwise calm waters" in this area of the law, as most circuits used the real
party in interest rule. 176 The waters have not been so calm as of late-a circuit
split has developed over what rule applies in situations where a party with the
capacity to sue is not the real party in interest. 77 With the myriad of different
situations in which this dispute arises and circuits going in different directions
on what rule controls, the Supreme Court must choose a rule that will prevail in
all diversity disputes occurring in federal courts.
A variety of policy concerns support the idea of a uniform rule. First,
uniformity in federal courts is important to ensure that the jurisdictional reach is
the same regardless of where the parties sue. The present situation, with
different circuits deciding whether diversity exists based on different rules,
encourages forum shopping by plaintiffs. Forum shopping is generally
considered an "evil" by Congress and the courts, as it avoids the jurisdiction of
the most appropriate court and may allow a plaintiff to alter the outcome of the
lawsuit. 78 Congress has passed several statutes with the underlying purpose of
preventing forum shopping.1 79 It is pointless to have a statute such as § 1359
that prevents collusion to create or defeat diversity if it is just as easily created
or defeated based on where the claim is brought.
Furthermore, wavering rules are extremely inefficient, both for the parties
to the suit and for the courts in the administration of justice. Parties will not
want to incur the additional costs of litigating jurisdictional matters arising from
lack of guidance provided by the Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme
Court has recently shown favor for adopting clear jurisdictional rules rather
But apart from the legal right conferred by statute on the administrator to bring this
action, is he in nowise a party in interest? Is he not liable, as the administrator, for
the costs of this action, in the event of his failure to recover, and for attorney's fees
to those he has employed to bring this suit? In the event of the death of the widow
and children, the amount recovered would be assets in his hands, as administrator,
for disposal according to law. If he succeeds in this action, and collects the money
of the defendant, and fails to pay the same to the parties entitled thereto, clearly he
will be liable on his official bond therefor[e].
Id.
176. See Cohan & Tate, supra note 1 at 225-26 (noting that in 1956 most circuits agreed
on the real party in interest rule).
177. See supra Part VII (describing the current circuit split).
178. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo.
2000) (describing the negative results of forum shopping).
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000) (allowing for the change of venue when an alternate
venue would be more convenient); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (prohibiting collusive
manufacture or defeat of diversity to prevent forum shopping).
180. See supra Part VII.A (describing the lack of clarity resulting from Supreme Court
decisions considering the diversity dispute).
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than uncertain rules that can lead to years of additional litigation. 18' The Court
noted that "whether destruction or perfection of jurisdiction is at issue, the
policy goal of minimizing litigation over jurisdiction is thwarted whenever a
new exception.., is announced, arousing hopes of further new exceptions in
the future."1 82 A uniform rule in diversity disputes would remove hope of
exceptions and significantly cut down on jurisdictional litigation. Moreover,
federal judges already complain that they are overburdened with diversity
cases. 183 It only aggravates the matter to have extensive jurisdictional hearings
to determine whether removal was even proper in the first place.
Also, a party may not have brought suit in the first place if the party knew
in advance that jurisdiction would not exist in federal court. The Supreme
Court observed that "[w]hen the stakes remain the same and the players have
been shown each other's cards, they will not likely play the hand all the way
through just for the sake of the game."' 184 A uniform rule will keep the "stakes"
the same, and parties will realize that it is in their best interest to settle when
they would have otherwise brought suit in hopes of arguing for the application
of a different diversity jurisdiction rule.
Finally, one of the main rationales behind the creation of diversity
jurisdiction is to guarantee a fair trial without local bias to potential litigants
from other states. 85 This intended reliability is not present if parties have to
concern themselves with whether they are in a capacity to sue or a real party in
interest jurisdiction. The clear solution to the problem would be to choose one
national rule.
B. Courts Should Adopt the Capacity to Sue Rule
This Note insists that courts should measure diversity of citizenship by the
citizenship of any party with the capacity to sue, even if that party stands in a
representative or other close legal relationship to a nonparty whose citizenship
would destroy (or create) diversity jurisdiction. The capacity to sue rule more
closely adheres to the original intent behind the creation of diversity jurisdiction
181. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004) (noting
that the two additional years ofjurisdiction litigation would have been better spent litigating the
merits or engaging in settlement talks).
182. Id. at 580-81.
183. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (listing instances of judges criticizing
diversity jurisdiction because it congests federal courts' caseloads).
184. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 581.
185. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing one of the justifications for
diversity jurisdiction).
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than the real party in interest rule. While scholars have offered many
explanations for the creation of diversity jurisdiction, i8 6 the most prevalent is
that diversity was intended to provide a neutral forum for out-of-state
litigants. 8 7 If a litigant has the capacity to sue, he will face these alleged biases
regardless of whether he is the real party in interest. He is still the litigant who
is in the courtroom dealing with a local judge, the network of local attorneys,
and a jury of people from a geographically local region.
Some may argue that the judge and jury will overlook the party that is
suing under his legal capacity and only focus on the underlying party, who may
share citizenship with the adverse party and not suffer from this bias. A lawsuit
consists of more than just the substance, though. Many procedural issues and
motions are decided as the case proceeds. The foreign party, rather than the
local party, will argue these motions in front of a local judge. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court recognizes that while a party may not be the real party in
interest, he may still have many other concerns about the outcome.
88
Many scholars have argued that this bias against out-of-state parties no
longer exists in the modern era of international business1 89 But it is hard to
know whether this rationale still is, or ever was, legitimate, as it is difficult to
identify bias in all its forms. For the sake of argument, even if the rationale is
no longer valid, the real party in interest rule is not the solution. This rule
would only be a partial solution to the greater problem. As long as diversity
jurisdiction exists, parties will try to find ways to manufacture jurisdiction. If
the rationale truly no longer exists, then the real change should come in the
form of congressional abolition of diversity jurisdiction entirely.' 90
If the courts begin to uniformly apply the capacity to sue rule, it will force
Congress to either accept this interpretation or enact legislation changing the
way diversity is determined in these circumstances. Ifjudges and courts really
hold as much disdain for diversity as some have expressed,' 91 this would be the
best way to bring about its early demise. This would not be the first time
Congress changed the law in response to a perceived misinterpretation by the
186. See supra Part H and accompanying notes (describing the reasons advanced for the
creation of diversity jurisdiction).
187. See Friendly, supra note 26, at 493-95 (noting that the original reason for the creation
of diversity jurisdiction was out-of-state businesses' fears of local prejudices).
188. See supra note 79 (describing the interests a party with the capacity to sue retains in
the outcome of a lawsuit even if he is not entitled to a portion of the judgment).
189. See supra Part III (describing the modem criticisms of diversity jurisdiction).
190. See infra Part VIII.D (calling for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction by Congress if
the justifications for its creation no longer exist).
191. See supra notes 46, 53 and accompanying text (detailing the dislike among many
judges of diversity jurisdiction).
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Supreme Court. 92 Courts have already made the situation more difficult than it
needs to be. Congress did not mention motive in the language of § 1359193-
the decision to ignore motive came from the Supreme Court. 94 If courts were
able to consider motive for joinder, there would be no controversy over whether
a party's citizenship controls. It would be a fact-sensitive, case by case inquiry.
If courts find that the capacity to sue rule lends itself to greater abuse by
collusive joinder, another alternative exists. To prevent any collusion
whatsoever, diversity jurisdiction should be disallowed if either the real party in
interest or the party with the capacity to sue is nondiverse from any party on the
opposing side. This would be similar to the rule for corporate domicile, which
provides that the corporation is a citizen of the state of its principle place of
business and of its state of incorporation, and there is no diversity if either of
those states is the same as the state of citizenship of any opposing party.195 This
rule would have the benefits of eliminating the dispute over which rule applies
(both would be considered), and the rule would have the virtue of limiting
diversity jurisdiction more than either of the tests previously discussed. On the
other hand, this rule would add complications by increasing judicial workload,
and it might deny diversity jurisdiction in some cases where it should otherwise
exist. Regardless, the uniform adoption of either of these rules would at least
provide consistency across the circuits.
C. Reasons for Supporting the Capacity to Sue Rule Over the Real Party in
Interest Rule
The capacity to sue rule is easy to apply, unlike its counterpart, the real
party in interest rule. The Third Circuit identified two methods for determining
whether a party has the capacity to sue. 196 While it did not specify which
method is preferable, it did note that as a practical matter, the result will be the
192. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2007) (David P. Siegel, cmt. on 1988 revision)
(describing how 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) overruled the Supreme Court decision in Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), which rejected the doctrine of "pendent party jurisdiction").
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) (omitting any reference to parties' motives).
194. See Mecom v. Fitzimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (1931) ("[lIt is clear that
the motive or purpose that actuated any or all of these parties in procuring a lawful and valid
appointment is immaterial upon the question of identity or diversity of citizenship.").
195. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business .... ").
196. See Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 327-29 (3rd Cir. 1955) (describing the two
methods for determining whether a party has capacity to sue).
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same either way.19 7 First, courts can look to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(b) to see if the party has the capacity to sue.' 98  If that rule is not
enlightening, courts should decide based on whether the party has the capacity
to sue under state law.199 A similar result is reached regardless, making the
capacity to sue rule more appealing than the real party in interest rule, which
lacks such an easy determination. As mentioned, courts acknowledge that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), which applies to the real party in
interest, is procedural and does not extend to jurisdiction decisions.
200
While one scholar has justified the real party in interest rule as the only
way of preventing collusion,20' this takes for granted the fact that judges are
capable of weeding out these collusive claims on their own. The courts are
empowered by § 1359 to dismiss cases involving these abusive joinders. While
the Supreme Court has taken the teeth away from the act to a certain extent by
forbidding courts to look to a party's motives in joinders, the Third Circuit has
disregarded the decree against considering motive,20 2 noting that the
consideration of motive is intrinsically linked with § 1359. 203 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court never intended for lower courts to apply § 1359 so strictly as to
prevent parties from litigating where a forum would otherwise exist. The Court
noted that "[t]he evil which [§ 1359] was intended to obviate was the voluntary
creation of Federal jurisdiction by simulated assignments. But assignments by
197. See id. at 329 (noting that the same result is reached regardless of which approach is
taken).
198. See id. (suggesting that courts look to Rule 17(b) to determine whether a party has the
capacity to sue); see also Smith v. Sperling, 117 F. Supp. 781, 790 (S.D. Cal. 1953), rev'don
other grounds, 354 U.S. 91, 91 (1957) (noting that FED. R. Civ. P. 17 gives the right to sue to
executors, administrators, guardians, and trustees). But see Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702,
705-06 (6th Cir. 1964) (rejecting the use of FED. R. Civ. P. 17 and instead looking to state law
to determine whether a party has the capacity to sue).
199. See Fallat, 220 F.2d at 329 (suggesting that courts look to state law to determine
whether a party has the capacity to sue); see also Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S.
429, 433 (1903) (same).
200. See supra Part IV.A (noting that Rule 17(a) is procedural rather than jurisdictional).
201. See Cohan & Tate, supra note 1, at 245 ("It is very difficult, if not impossible to find
sound jurisprudential reasons supporting jurisdiction where it is created by the appointment of
an out-of-state representative solely to take advantage of the more liberal atmosphere of the
federal courts. This will not do.").
202. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189(1931) ("[I]t is clear that
the motive or purpose that actuated any or all of these parties in procuring a lawful and valid
appointment is immaterial upon the question of identity or diversity of citizenship.").
203. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 874 (3d Cir. 1968) ("[I]t is difficult to see
how motive can be entirely ignored in ascertaining the purpose for which the representative is
selected in view of the language of§ 1359.").
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operation of law, creating legal representatives, are not within the mischief or
reason of the law."
2 4
D. A Call for Legislative Reform
If there is still a fear of collusion despite federal judges' capability to
protect against it, then the problem is up to the legislature, not the courts, to
resolve. State legislatures granted these parties the legal right to sue, so the
same legislatures should close the loopholes that allow parties to abuse the
right. The most effective way to remedy the problem would be to draw
parameters that a party must meet to have his citizenship considered in each of
the circumstances in which the dispute could arise. For instance, in lawsuits by
guardians, the state legislature could specify that the guardian's citizenship
should only control if he actively litigates the suit and manages the award until
the ward reaches legal age.
Another solution would be for Congress to amend § 1359 to allow, or
even require, courts to look to the party's motive in joinder for signs of
collusion. This approach is not entirely unfounded, as it has already been
adopted by the Third Circuit.20 5 This should be a simple solution because the
parties often admit at the outset that the assignee is merely a straw party,20 6 but
under existing precedent, the court's hands are tied because motive is
"immaterial. ' ,20 7  Amended legislation could result in lengthier litigation
though, if parties start to mask their motives or create false motives to ensure
the court will uphold diversity jurisdiction. But if courts are merely permitted,
though not required, to inquire into motive, they could easily engage in a brief
preliminary inquiry to ensure that a blatantly collusive motive does not exist.
Finally, abolition of diversity jurisdiction entirely would be the best way to
prevent collusion to create diversity. This may sound like throwing the baby
out with the bathwater, but if there is no longer any justification for its
existence, then there is no reason to retain diversityjurisdiction. Many Justices,
most adamantly Justice Frankfurter, have endorsed this idea since diversity
208 admjurisdiction's inception. Congress and most courts, though, are not ready to
204. New Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595,606 (1891).
205. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that the consideration of motive is
intrinsically linked with § 1359).
206. See, e.g., McSparran, 402 F.2d at 869 (noting that the plaintiffs conceded that the
guardian was merely a straw party chosen solely to create diversity jurisdiction).
207. Mecom, 284 U.S. at 189.
208. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing Justice Frankfurter's dislike for
diversity jurisdiction).
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concede that the problem of bias against out of state litigants no longer
209exists.
IX Conclusion
Uniformity in diversity jurisdiction guidelines is of utmost importance, but
the courts of appeals have split over whether the real party in interest or the
capacity to sue rule should apply in deciding whose citizenship controls when
an agent sues on behalf of a principal. This split is likely to result in forum
shopping and increased litigation costs. To prevent these negative side effects,
courts should adopt a uniform rule-the capacity to sue rule. This rule is
preferable to the real party in interest rule because it is more attuned to the
original purpose behind the creation of diversity jurisdiction. Also, as a
practical matter, the capacity to sue rule is easier to apply than the real party in
interest rule.
Some courts and scholars, fearing collusive joinder, have advocated the
real party in interest rule. Collusion to create diversity jurisdiction is a
troubling matter, but it is not the role of the judiciary to solve this problem.
Ultimately, the problem of manufactured diversity is a matter for the
Legislature to resolve. Congress created the problem when it created diversity
jurisdiction, and it has shown its willingness over the years to alter the scope of
cases that qualify for diversity jurisdiction when necessary. As evidenced by
the split among the circuit courts, it is now time for Congress to act again to
clarify the situation. Until then, the courts should follow the uniform rule of
looking to the citizenship of the party with the capacity to sue when deciding
whether diversity jurisdiction exists.
209. See supra Part III (describing current support among courts, Congress, and scholars
for retention of diversity jurisdiction).
